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A B S T R A C T
This paper empirically investigates the impact of the implementation process for the Voluntary Partnership
Agreement (VPA) in Cameroon on the volume of exported wood from Cameroon to the European Union (EU).
This is achieved by applying time series analysis, change point detection, and vector autoregression with exo-
genous variables. No previous research has quantitatively analyzed the long-term impact of VPAs on traded
wood. Two major conclusions are drawn. First, the VPA, and accompanying improved forest governance, ne-
gatively impacted on the wood volume exported from Cameroon when it came into force (December 2011).
However, wood extraction in Cameroon's neighboring countries increased as operators can still economically
beneﬁt from less stringent environmental standards in these countries. Second, this paper observes anticipative
behavior before the VPA came into eﬀect. During the negotiations, exports decreased due to redirection of the
trade ﬂows, and uncertainty concerning the outcome of the negotiations. However, during the months before the
VPA came into force, wood exports sharply increased. This is explained by rent-seeking behavior by operators
who wished to beneﬁt from the less stringent trade conditions, whilst they lasted.
1. Introduction
This paper empirically investigates the impact of the implementa-
tion process for the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) in
Cameroon on the volume of wood exported from Cameroon to the
European Union (EU) using time series analysis, change point detection,
and vector autoregression with exogenous variables.
VPAs, together with the EU's Timber Regulation (EUTR) are the two
main elements in the EU's Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and
Trade Action Plan (FLEGT) (Lesniewska and McDermott, 2014). This
action plan ‘focuses on the wood trade and enforcement of forest laws
and regulation as a way to combat illegal logging’ and improve forest
governance at global level (Tegegne et al., 2017). Since 2013, the EUTR
has required a due diligence system (DDS) for the legality of imported
wood and wood products (Leipold, 2017). This is intended to prevent
the placement of illegal wood (products) on the EU-market. Since the
wood operators bear the cost of this DDS, these more stringent re-
quirements could create a trade barrier (Xu, 2000).
While the EUTR prohibits the placement of illegal wood on the EU-
market, VPAs help wood-producing countries to ensure that the wood
products they export to the EU are legal. A VPA is a ‘legally binding
trade agreement between the EU and a wood-producing country outside
the EU’ (European Commission, 2017a,b,c). These agreements combine
legality licensing with multi-stakeholder processes1 that address un-
derlying problems of forest governance (Lesniewska and McDermott,
2014). A country can only award FLEGT legality licenses to its opera-
tors on the precondition of an EU-approved legality assurance system.
FLEGT licensed operators gain automatic access to the EU market
(Carodenuto and Cerutti, 2014) and avoid the costs relating to DDS. By
granting automatic access to the EU market, a VPA has elements in
common with, but is not completely similar to a Free Trade Agreement
(FTA). This can potentially be beneﬁcial for the wood producing
countries as renewable resources can positively impact economic
growth, on the precondition of an open economy and well-functioning
institutions (Tajibaeva, 2012).
This paper is the ﬁrst to present an analysis of the VPA's impact on
Cameroon's wood exports to the EU. This is useful for two reasons. First,
it is interesting to investigate the impact of any FTA, as FTAs do not
necessarily increase trade ﬂows and thus speciﬁc conclusions can be
derived from this case. According to Burﬁsher et al. (2001), “whether or
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not a regional trade agreement beneﬁts its members will depend on
parameter values and initial economic structure — it is essentially an
empirical issue that must be settled by data analysis”. In addition, the
nature of the FTA also determines the extent of its impact (Lake and
Yildiz, 2016) and when FTAs involve natural resources, there is an
additional risk for overexploitation (Ferreira, 2007). Second,
Carodenuto and Cerutti (2014) identify the lack of research which
speciﬁcally focusses on VPAs' potential and their actual impact: “ex-
isting research regarding long-term impacts is speculative or relates to
the processes preceding legality veriﬁcation”. To date, no such research
has been conducted (either for Cameroon or for other VPA countries).
FTAs do not necessarily increase trade, and this is no diﬀerent for
the VPA in Cameroon, especially since the VPA comes with responsi-
bilities. Wood operators can only obtain a FLEGT license if they meet
the stipulated legality criteria. This often requires considerable changes
in forest management practices. Those changes, and the accompanying
costs, might exclude some of Cameroon's operators from participation
in trade with the EU. Cameroon is currently reviewing the ﬁrst round of
applications for FLEGT licenses (European Union, 2016), but has, so far,
not awarded any license. Nevertheless, the VPA is expected to have an
impact, since a VPA implies governance reforms, legislative and policy
reforms and impact monitoring (Carodenuto and Cerutti, 2014;
European Commission, 2017a,b,c). This is conﬁrmed by Cerutti et al.
(2016) who describe how the VPA became key in the reforms of the
Cameroonian wood sector over the last years. These reforms aﬀect
every wood operator in Cameroon.
This paper does not focus solely on the point in time when the EU-
Cameroon VPA was agreed or came into force (May 2010 and December
2011 respectively). In addition, the analysis takes into account the
whole negotiation period (November 2007 – May 2010). This is ne-
cessary since multiple authors have observed increased trade volumes
during the negotiation period which precedes an FTA coming into force
(Croce et al., 2004; Coulibaly, 2007; Freund and Ornelas, 2010;
Mölders and Volz, 2011). Magee (2008) quantiﬁes the anticipation ef-
fect of regional trading agreements – in general – as about 25%
throughout the four years prior to an FTA coming into force. Baier et al.
(2014) even described how some authors reverse the causality. In this
reasoning FTAs emerge as a consequence of intense trade.
According to Eichengreen and Irwin (1998), the explanation for this
anticipation eﬀect is twofold. First, suppliers begin to redirect ‘their
exports in anticipation of future market openings’. Second, less formal
arrangements often precede the conclusion of an FTA. This stimulates
trade between the negotiating countries and reinforces the anticipation
eﬀect. Alternatively, Csilla and Nilsson (2015) stress the importance of
reduced trade policy uncertainty as the negotiation process proceeds.
An uncertain trade environment does not stimulate trade (Fontagné
et al., 2015).
In the European context, the anticipation eﬀect is observed for nu-
merous intra- and extra-EU agreements. At intra-EU level, the antici-
pation eﬀect ﬁrst occurred prior to the formation of the European Coal
and Steel Community in 1951 (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998). Subse-
quently, increased trade ﬂows were observed prior to the diﬀerent EU
expansions, for example when Portugal joined in 1986 (Csilla and
Nilsson, 2015; Handley and Limao, 2015). At extra-EU level, the an-
ticipation eﬀect occurred prior to agreement on the EU-Korea FTA
(Csilla and Nilsson, 2015).
Also, this paper ﬁnds (signiﬁcant) eﬀects during the period which
preceded the VPA coming into force. Depending on the conditions,
Cameroon's exports to the EU were positively or negatively aﬀected by
the VPA's implementation process.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second part
describes the context of the EU-Cameroon VPA. Part three describes the
data and methods applied in order to investigate the impact on trade
ﬂows. Part four presents the results of the analysis, while part ﬁve
discusses these results prior to ending with a conclusion.
2. FLEGT and the VPA in Cameroon
The entire VPA implementation process in Cameroon consists of 3
phases. The ﬁrst phase encompasses the VPA negotiations (November
2007 – May 2010). The second phase starts with the VPA agreement in
May 2010 and ends with the VPA coming into force (December 2011).
Hence, at this stage the negotiations are ﬁnalized, and the outcome of
the negotiations is known. However, the bilateral binding agreement
did not enter into force yet. The third period runs from the VPA's entry
into force up to the present.
Tegegne et al. (2017) describe how this entire process has been
managed by the Cameroon Ministry of Forests and Wildlife. The min-
istry created two agencies to negotiate and implement the VPA process:
the Joint Implementation Council to oversee the VPA implementation,
and a National Monitoring Committee to guide and assess the VPA
implementation. At least one of the two agencies includes re-
presentatives of the Prime Minister's oﬃce and ﬁve government min-
istries, the National Assembly, the private sector, civil society, in-
digenous people and community forests. The high number of
stakeholders involved is one of the reasons why this process is often
perceived as a “good” process (Dooley and Ozinga, 2011; Tegegne
et al., 2014).
Since 2011, Cameroon has been developing its ‘Timber Legality
Assurance System and methods of impact monitoring, and im-
plementing transparency commitments’ (Tegegne et al., 2017). Barriers
to VPA implementation in Cameroon are corruption, the informal
nature of the domestic sector, non-sensitive wood demand, techni-
calities of the legality assurance system, the high cost of legality and




This paper claims that it is relevant and necessary to individually
investigate the Cameroonian case because each VPA is unique. A VPA is
a bilateral agreement between the EU and a wood-producing country,
hence both the process of negotiation and implementation of a VPA
diﬀer for each country (Van Heeswijk and Turnhout, 2013; Wiersum
and Elands, 2013; European Commission, 2017a,b,c). Also, the type of
wood products covered by each VPA diﬀers. Hence, diﬀerent VPAs will
generate heterogeneous impacts across the world.2 Therefore this paper
does not consider VPAs simultaneously.
The reason for selecting the case of Cameroon is threefold. First, the
EU-Cameroon VPA came into force on 1st December 2011. The nego-
tiations started in November 2007. Suﬃcient time has therefore passed
to be able to assess the impact of it coming into force and the preceding
implementation period. At global level, only the VPA with Ghana came
into force earlier (December 2009), but throughout the period
2000–2015 Ghana exported 5 times less wood to the EU (EUROSTAT,
2017). This is the second reason to opt for Cameroon: it is the most
important African exporter of tropical hardwood to the EU (Tegegne
et al., 2014) and therefore a relevant case to investigate. Third, Ca-
meroon is surrounded by countries which also export wood to the EU.
This creates the opportunity to compare Cameroon's exports with its
regional counterfactual.
Carodenuto and Cerutti (2014) provide additional arguments in
favor of this comparison as they identify three important common
properties across the wood markets of Cameroon and its surrounding
2 At present, the EU has signed 6 VPAs with the following wood-producing countries:
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ghana, Indonesia, Liberia, and the Republic of the
Congo. Nine other countries are in the process of negotiation: Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guyana, Honduras, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam
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countries in the Congo basin. First, they observe a comparable im-
portance of the informal wood sector, next to the formal sector, in
Cameroon and the other countries in the Congo basin. Second, they
observe a discrepancy between small-scale producers supplying the
domestic market and large-scale producers supplying the export market
across the diﬀerent countries in the Congo basin. More in particular
they describe how the export activities are concentrated in a “handful
of international corporate conglomerates”. Fewer than 20 companies
account for over 80% of the Cameroonian wood production
(Carodenuto and Cerutti, 2014; Cerutti et al., 2016) and those compa-
nies operate in both Cameroon and its neighboring countries. Third, the
Cameroonian legal framework has been used a model for other coun-
tries in the Congo basin, creating important resemblances across the
countries' legal frameworks.
This research opts for a regional instead of a global counterfactual in
order to ensure that homogenous trade ﬂows are compared. Comparing
Cameroon's exports to the export by, for example, Argentina or
Indonesia could cause some problems because those countries grow
diﬀerent species. Consequently, they produce and export diﬀerent types
of wood as well, and their export ﬂows are too heterogeneous to
compare. In addition, the distance to the EU's wood market would diﬀer
too considerably to allow comparison between the exports by
Cameroon and, for example, Indonesia.
3.2. Data
Monthly trade data for the period January 2000 – December 2015
was retrieved from the EUROSTAT (2017) ‘International Trade in goods
– detailed data by HS2-HS4’ database. We used detailed trade data on
the volume (not value) at the 2 digit breakdown level for product ca-
tegory 44; “Wood and articles of wood”. This broad category en-
compasses a number of product categories which are not subject to the
EU-Cameroon VPA.3 However, all of Cameroon's exports of wood pro-
ducts to the EU are covered by the VPA except for charcoal, but char-
coal only represents a negligible 0.018% of the wood exports to the EU.
Hence, 99.982% of the exported volume represented by product clas-
siﬁcation 44 is subject to the VPA. For this reason, we can make use of
this aggregated number to analyze the impact of the VPA im-
plementation process. The monthly volumes exported to the EU are
indexed. The observation for January 2000 was set at 100.
The counterfactual was calculated by taking the mean of the in-
dexed monthly volumes exported to the EU by Cameroon's neighbors.
The indexed values allow a more straightforward comparison between
the evolution of Cameroon's exports to the exports from its regional
counterfactual. This paper opted for the aggregate counterfactual in
order to level out the impact of country-speciﬁc events in the neigh-
boring countries. Two country-speciﬁc elements especially drive the use
of an aggregate counterfactual. First, the impact of the diﬀerent the
neighboring countries implementing a VPA (European Commission,
2017a,b,c), entering diﬀerent VPA implementation phases, or im-
plementing the VPA at a diﬀerent speed has to be leveled-out. Second,
this approach levels out country-speciﬁc errors following the incon-
sistent use of the conversion factor between the metrics for wood trade
in cubic meter and ton, in the EUROSTAT database. Without accounting
for the inconsistent use, the usefulness of the trade data could be en-
dangered (Rougieux et al., 2017). In addition, no better databases for
this kind of analysis are available. At international level, also the re-
maining global databases on international trade suﬀer these short-
comings. At Cameroonian level, also the data oﬀered by oﬃcial gov-
ernmental organizations was found inadequate. Chupezi et al. (2015)
for example identify major disparities between Cameroonian port data
on wood exports and the central forest administration.
The neighboring countries taken into account include Equatorial
Guinea, the Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Nigeria,
and Gabon. Chad is the only neighboring country which is not in-
corporated in the analysis. This is explained by the low level of wood
(products) exports by Chad. Ghana is also an important wood producer
in the West-African region, but nevertheless it is not incorporated in the
counterfactual because its exports are too erratic.
3.3. Empirical speciﬁcation
This paper starts with some general descriptive statistics on the
exported volumes of wood by both Cameroon and its counterfactual to
the EU. The descriptive statistics include a decomposition of the ob-
served trade ﬂows into a trend, seasonal and random component, and
the general likelihood ratio method, as introduced by Hinkley (1970),
in order to check for the presence of a single change point in the mean
exported wood volumes.4 This allows the detection of a change in the
statistical properties of the sequence of observations for the exported
volumes from Cameroon to the EU changed, on the precondition this
kind of change is present.
The change point detection does not provide irrefutable evidence
for the impact of the VPA implementation phases. Therefore, this paper
presents a Vector Autoregression (VAR) for a more thorough analysis of
the impact of the VPA implementation. This research uses a Seemingly
Unrelated Model such as VAR because its autoregression part allows
that a time series' current value partially depends upon its previous
levels. In addition, its vector part can capture linear interdependence
between the lagged values of diﬀerent time series. As such, the VAR
accounts for correlated errors, but does not assume that the current
levels of the two endogenous trade ﬂows can impact each other (Chan
and Chung, 1995). Our time series represent the physical wood ﬂows
from diﬀerent countries to the EU. Hence, this kind of interdependence
can be expected. This paper assumes that the current level of exports
from both Cameroon and its counterfactual in month t (respectively
Ycam, t and Yreg, t) depend on the previous levels of exports (Ycam, t−p and
Yreg, t−p, in which p stands for the lag order). This results in the fol-
lowing VAR speciﬁcation:
= + …+ +
− −
y A y A y ut t p t p t1 1 (1)
In which yt is a 2× 1 matrix constructed out of the two endogenous
variables Ycam, t and Yreg, t. Ai is the time-invariant 2×p coeﬃcient-
matrix and ut is a 2× 1 matrix which represents the error term. The
Bayesian Information Criterion is used in order to determine lag order
p.
As indicated, this paper aims to investigate the impact of the VPA
implementation process on Cameroon's wood exports to the EU. Three
phases are distinguished: the negotiation period, the period in which
the VPA was agreed but had not come into force, and the period in
which the VPA came into force. Three dummy variables are created in
order to identify the respective phases: xneg, t, xagr, t, and xeif, t. The use of
dummy variables to measure the impact of the VPA is in line with
earlier research (Foster et al., 2011; Baier et al., 2014). The exogenous
dummy variables are separately introduced in the initial VAR in order
to assess the impact of the separate phases. Introducing exogenous
variables in a VAR transforms it into a VARX model. For the negotiation
phase this would result in the following speciﬁcation:
= + …+ + +
− −
y A y A y Bx ut t p t p neg t t1 1 , (2)
In which B is a time-invariant 2× 1 matrix which represents the
impact of the dummy variable xneg, t on the exports to the EU by
Cameroon (Ycam, t) and its counterfactual (Yreg, t) respectively. The
choice for the VARX approach is based on the assumption that the trade
ﬂow from Cameroon is likely to be aﬀected, but not determined, by the
3 The EU-Cameroon VPA covers logs, sawn wood, veneers, plywood, railway sleepers,
sleepers, furniture, fuel wood and wooden tools. 4 This analysis made use of the AMOC algorithm.
J. Brusselaers, J. Buysse Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 167–179
169
VPA implementation. The VARX model allows the distinction between
endogenous variables which mutually determine each other (i.e. the
export variables for Cameroon and its counterfactual) and exogenous
variables which have an inﬂuence on the endogenous variables (i.e. the
dummy variables per VPA implementation phase).
The possibility to include the VPA implementation phases as exo-
genous variable is another argument in favor of the Seemingly
Unrelated Models such as VARX models. In Simultaneous Equation
Models, our analysis could falsely conclude that the export ﬂows by
Cameroon and its counterfactual are contemporaneously correlated
(even if there is no instantaneous feedback between both markets) if
both time series react simultaneously to the exogenous variable. Note
that it is plausible that both time series indeed react simultaneously
given their interchangeability as wood supplier to the EU. This would
imply that the eﬀect of the exogenous variable cannot be isolated from
that of common trends in the two time series. According to us, no in-
stantaneous feedback should be expected between the trade ﬂows of
Cameroon and its counterfactual. In addition, our model does not di-
rectly capture unobservable shocks (e.g. political unrest). In the case
exogenous shocks are unobservable, a Simultaneous Equation Model
can yield unreliable inferences on the causal relationship between the
two trade ﬂows. Instead, Chan and Chung (1995) describe how VAR
models can reveal the underlying process better than Simultaneous
Equation Models when no actual contemporaneous interaction occurs
between the two markets/trade ﬂows. In this research's VARX model,
the counterfactual is composed as the mean of the neighboring coun-
tries' trade ﬂows. This approach dilutes the impact of country-speciﬁc
disturbing factors in the counterfactual construct.
4. Analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
The upper graph in Fig. 1 displays the observed evolution of the
wood exports from Cameroon to the EU for the period 2000–2015. The
second to fourth graph in Fig. 1 decomposes this observed time series
into a general trend for the 2000–2015 period, a seasonal component
and a random term.
The decomposition uncovered a decreasing trend throughout the
period under consideration. This suggests that the volumes of wood
(products) exported from Cameroon to the EU have been decreasing.
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test shows that the trend component of
the traded volume time series is stationary. The decreasing general
trend of Cameroonian wood exports to the EU contrasts to the in-
creasing total Cameroonian wood exports as observed by Cerutti et al.
(2016) between 2005 and 2014 and by the FAO (2016). This overall
increase is explained by an increased wood demand in Asia (notably
China and India), exceptional measures5 to face the ﬁnancial crisis, and
presumably increased illegal loggings.
A seasonal component was also observed (third graph, Fig. 1). This
is due to Cameroon's rainy season which prevents the transport of the
wood. Finally, the random component of the time series is itself sta-
tionary (tested by making use of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test).
Fig. 2 displays the indexed volume of exported wood (products)
from Cameroon's neighbors to the EU for the period 2000–2015. The
ﬁrst graph displays the time series observed. A downward sloping trend
was observed, although this was less clear than for the Cameroonian
time series. This is also demonstrated in the second graph in Fig. 2.
Note, however, that this general trend experienced a revival in both
2010 and 2012. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test indicates that the
general trend is only stationary at 10% CI, while the overall (non-de-
composed) wood exports by the counterfactual are stationary at 5% CI.
The seasonal component of the overall time series is again de-
termined by the rainy season in Central and West Africa and shows a
Fig. 1. decomposition of additive time series: Cameroon's wood export to the EU, indexed (2000=100), period 2000–2015.
5 Cerutti et al. (2016) provide a detailed overview of these measures, but this is beyond
this research's scope.
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comparable pattern compared to the seasonal component in Cameroon's
wood exports to the EU. The correlation coeﬃcient for the seasonal
component in Cameroon's and the counterfactual's exports is 0.66
(Appendix A). Note that this ﬁnding conﬁrms the homogeneity of the
demarcated region. Finally, the random component of the regional
counterfactual's exports to the EU also deserves some attention. The
mean of this random component does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the
random component of Cameroon's exported volume to the EU (tested by
making use of a t-test) and by default equals zero. The variance of both
random components, however, does diﬀer. An F-test indicates that the
variance in the counterfactual's random component is signiﬁcantly
higher than the variance for Cameroon's random component. This
suggests a more stable trade relationship between the EU and Cameroon
compared to the trade relationship between the EU and the counter-
factual.
4.2. Change point detection
The previous analysis revealed a decreasing trend throughout the
2000–2015 period. This paper applies the Binary Segmentation tech-
nique, as introduced by Scott and Knott (1974), to check for the pre-
sence of change points. The Binary Segmentation technique is the most
widely used change point search method (Killick et al., 2012). In this
research's rationale, a change point represents the point at which the
long-run mean of the wood volume exported by Cameroon to the EU
signiﬁcantly changed. The result of the change point detection is pre-
sented in Fig. 3.
The outcome of the analysis is interesting for two reasons. First,
three main change point are detected. Hence, the exported wood vo-
lume from Cameroon to the EU has indeed decreased signiﬁcantly over
time. Second, one of the change points for the mean was found to be in
November 2007. Therefore, the change point coincided with the start of
the VPA negotiations in Cameroon. The mean of the (indexed) exported
wood volume from Cameroon to the EU was 85.3 before the start of the
VPA negotiations. After November 2007, the long run-mean of
Cameroon's exported wood value decreased to 53.0 A drop of 32.3
index points, from which Cameroon's exports have never recovered.
This type of analysis does not provide irrefutable proof of the impact
of the start of the VPA negotiations. The downward sloping trend for
exported wood volumes by Cameroon to the EU implies that it is likely
that a change point was detected in this period. It could be a coin-
cidence that the change point was detected at the start of the VPA
negotiations.
Nevertheless, this analysis does suggest a negative impact of the
VPA negotiations on the volume of wood exported by Cameroon to the
EU. Moreover, it suggests that the exports did not recover from this
setback. The suggestion is strengthened by the observation that the
Fig. 2. decomposition of additive time series: regional counterfactual's wood export to the EU, indexed (2000=100), period 2000–2015.
Fig. 3. Change point detection for the mean exported volume of wood from Cameroon to
the EU, indexed (2000=100), period 2000–2015.
Note: Change points detected in July 2001, November 2007, and October 2012.
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counterfactual's second change point was only found in July 2008.
Hence, the VPA negotiations could have accelerated the downward
trend in Cameroon in comparison to the situation in its neighboring
countries. In addition, the decline in mean exported value before and
after the change point was smaller for the counterfactual. The mean
decreased from 95.2 to 73.5, a drop of 21.7 index points (compared to
32.3 for Cameroon). We cannot conclude anything based on suggestive
analysis, but at least this analysis indicates that our subsequent analysis
should devote some attention to the point at which the VPA negotia-
tions started, alongside the VPA agreement and it coming into force.
This is in line with the literature review in section 1.
4.3. VARX model
The presence of a change point which coincides with the start of the
VPA negotiations suggests an impact of the negotiation period on ex-
ports. In addition, Cameroon's trade ﬂow did not recover from this
setback once the VPA was agreed or came into force. This paper pre-
sents three VARX models in order to check this more thoroughly. One
unique model was created for each VPA implementation phase (nego-
tiation, agreement, entry into force), as speciﬁed in Eq. (2). The exo-
genous identiﬁer variable was a dummy variable which had the value of
one during a speciﬁc implementation phase.
Prior to the construction of the VARX model, the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test and the Ljung-Box Test were applied in order to check
the stationary conditions for the time series on Cameroon's and the
counterfactual's exports. Both tests had a satisfactory outcome, which
enables the use of the VARX approach.
In addition to the model's variables, two parameters of the VARX
model must be speciﬁed: the order of the autoregressive part of the model
and the number of lags of the exogenous variable. This paper determines
both parameters by computing the Bayesian Information Criterion for the
VARX process. The order of the autoregression was set at 3. Hence the
current trade ﬂow was partially determined by the last three months' trade
ﬂows. Accordingly, the lag for the exogenous variable was set at 0. Hence,
no lagged impact was assumed for this variable.6
Fig. 1 displays the estimated coeﬃcients per model (Appendix B
presents the full output per model). The constant term and the coeﬃ-
cients for the autoregressive part of the VARX models do not diﬀer
drastically from each other. Hence, the vector autoregression manages
to consistently capture the overall trend throughout the 2000–2015
period.
Both the exports by Cameroon and its counterfactual are character-
ized by positive autocorrelation (third-order for Cameroon, ﬁrst-order for
the counterfactual). Noteworthy are the two negative, signiﬁcant, coef-
ﬁcients for cross-correlations (at ﬁrst order for Cameroon and second
order for the counterfactual). This suggests a substitution eﬀect between
Cameroon and its counterfactual as the EU's wood suppliers. Or put
diﬀerently, if the EU increases its imports from the counterfactual, this
occurs at the expense of the Cameroonian exports with a lag of one
month. Note that Cameroon's exports reversely respond earlier to
changes in the counterfactual's export. The substitution eﬀect appears to
be less important (smaller estimated coeﬃcient) for the counterfactual
and only manifests itself at order two, hence after two months.
The analysis of the coeﬃcients of the exogenous variables provides
insights into the eﬀect of the VPA implementation phases on trade
ﬂows. Fig. 1 displays comparable coeﬃcients for both the VPA nego-
tiations and for the VPA coming into force. On the one hand, both
periods impacted negatively on Cameroonian exports. Hence, the
downward trend which was observed previously (Fig. 1) was ag-
gravated during the VPA negotiations, as well as by the VPA coming
into force. On the other hand, the counterfactual's exports were not
impacted by either VPA implementation phase. Finally, the analysis
includes a satisfactory check for stationarity of the VARX’ error terms
(Appendix B).
These ﬁndings are double checked by investigating what type of
trend, if any, occurred during the periods concerned (i.e. VPA negotia-
tion period, and VPA coming into force). This requires the construction of
a new vector. The vector compares, for each region and each month t in
the period concerned, whether the exports (Ycam, t and Yreg, t) diﬀer from
those from a year ago (Ycam, t−12 and Yreg, t−12). This results in a 30-item
vector for the 30-month VPA negotiation period, and one of 49 items for
the period following the VPA coming into force. Subsequently, a t-test is
applied to check whether the mean of these new vectors signiﬁcantly
diﬀered from zero. For Cameroon, the t-test indicates that the mean of
this vector is indeed signiﬁcantly negative for the negotiation period
(−15.86) and after the VPA came into force (−2.93). Hence, exports to
the EU from Cameroon are decreasing. The trend for the counterfactual's
exports has not been signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the external change of the
VPA negotiation and the VPA coming into force.
The 19month period between negotiation and the VPA coming into
force (May 2010 – November 2011) has had an opposite impact on
trade ﬂows. The exogenous variable did not have a signiﬁcant impact
on the Cameroonian exports. Instead, the exports by the counterfactual
were negatively distorted (coeﬃcient −8.55). The t-test approach was
again applied to check this more thoroughly. A new vector was com-
posed which compared the diﬀerences between each month's export
level and the export level from a year ago. For Cameroon, this reveals
that the exports consistently increased throughout this 19month period
(with a signiﬁcant positive mean of 7.16). Between 2000 and 2015, this
is the longest period during which each consecutive month's export
level was higher than the export level from a year ago. In contrast, the
mean vector for the counterfactual's exports does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
from zero. Put diﬀerently, during the period between negotiation and
the VPA coming into force, the counterfactual's exports did not sig-
niﬁcantly change compared to the previous period. This appears to be
in conﬂict with the earlier ﬁndings in the VARX model (Table 1).
However, the VARX coeﬃcients describe the impact of the concerned
period on the overall trend of the counterfactual's exports to the EU.
Taking the diﬀerences between exported volumes over the period of a
year is a more suggestive approach.
5. Discussion
This section discusses the impact of the three diﬀerent phases of the
implementation process. The periods are not discussed in chronological
order. Albeit indicative, the discussion presents an explanation for the
signiﬁcant, and opposite, impact of the diﬀerent implementation
phases. Finally, this section provides some ground for extrapolation of
the results.
5.1. Impact of the VPA into force
The VARX model reveals a negative impact of the VPA on
Cameroonian wood exports to the EU, since the VPA came into force on
1st December 2011. This is not what was expected since the VPA cre-
ates the opportunity to award FLEGT licenses to Cameroon's wood
operators. This license grants the operators automatic access to the EU's
wood market and exempts them for the due diligence requirement (and
the accompanying costs).7 As such, a VPA has a number of elements in
6 The Akaike Information Criterion suggested a lag order of 12. This relates to the
observed seasonality in the trade ﬂows. However, applying a 12-period lag results in
numerous non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the VARX output in combination with signiﬁcant
and positive coeﬃcients for lag 11 and 12. This could be expected since we observed
seasonality, and therefore increasing the lag order does not add value to the original
analysis. For this reason, this research adheres the suggestion by the Bayesian Information
Criterion and applies a lag order of 3.
7 The due diligence requirement only came into force in March 2013, which gave wood
operators time to adapt.
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common with FTAs. Cameroon's wood sector also expects to gain better
access to the EU's market due to the VPA (Cerutti et al., 2013;
Carodenuto and Cerutti, 2014).
The explanation for the negative impact of the VPA – once in force –
is threefold. First, as yet, Cameroon has been unable to develop an
approved assurance system to issue FLEGT licenses. This is a result of
the poor forest and value chain management practices in Cameroon's
wood sector. Anecdotal evidence by Carodenuto and Cerutti (2014), for
example, describes how the market works without any coordination:
“nobody can tell you exactly where their wood comes from; it's from
wherever you can ﬁnd it”. This is problematic for the implementation of
a legality assurance system. The lack of an operational FLEGT licensing
system does not necessarily negatively impact Cameroon's trading po-
sition. However, despite the lack of licensing system, the Cameroonian
operators are facing other changes due to the VPA coming into force:
governance reforms, legislative and policy reforms and impact mon-
itoring (Carodenuto and Cerutti, 2014; European Commission,
2017a,b,c). Cerutti et al. (2016) conﬁrms this logic by describing how
the VPA became the main driver for reforms in the Cameroonian wood
sector throughout the last years. This creates additional obligations and
accompanying costs for Cameroon's operators, or at least the prospect
of and anticipation to these costs. Other countries' operators do not face
these additional obligations and costs. Hence, the VPA coming into
force could negatively impact Cameroon's competitive position as the
VPA has turned FLEGT into something inevitable in Cameroon. Instead,
Cameroon's neighboring countries only faced the EUTR, which imposes
more stringent trade conditions on all wood producing countries, as of
2013.
This is in line with Ferreira and Vincent (2010), who describe how
improved forest governance can reduce wood harvest in developing
countries, and Greaker (2006), who describe how environmental stan-
dards (licensing) can damage international trade if producers cannot
meet the requirements. Note that the substitution eﬀect between the
countries in the Congo basin as wood supplier to the EU is potentially
reinforced by the observation that the exporting conglomerates' activ-
ities are not concentrated in one single country but span the entire
Congo basin. As a consequence, they can possibly shift activities from
one country to another more easily.
Two ﬁnal remarks nuance the ﬁndings concerning the competitive
disadvantage in Cameroon. First, the competitive disadvantage might
turn into a competitive advantage once the EUTR is activated because
Cameroon took a head start (but insuﬃcient time has passed to assess
this). Second, other authors found that improved forest governance can
increase wood extraction (Wendland et al., 2014). Second, a consider-
able number of (especially small-scale) Cameroonian wood operators
cannot bear the high upfront investment costs in order to become eli-
gible for FLEGT licensing. Carodenuto and Cerutti (2014) described
how the underdeveloped banking system worsens this barrier to FLEGT
licensing at company level. Large-scale operators, with access to
funding, manage to comply with the VPA stipulations. Since they can
invest upfront, they beneﬁt from easier access to the EU's wood market.
This is in line with the ﬁndings of Rodrigue and Soumonni (2014), who
describe how investments in abatement in the Indonesian wood in-
dustry improve export performance. Also Fontagné et al. (2015) found
that larger operators are more able to attenuate the negative impact of
the trade barrier created by environmental norms. Following Foellmi
and Oechslin (2010), however, this phenomenon comes with a risk of
increased income disparity. While wealthy entrepreneurs take ad-
vantage of new export opportunities, the relatively poor entrepreneurs
lose wealth and market power.
Third, expert consultation (European Forest Institute, 2017; Global
Timber Platform, 2017) indicates that the stipulations in the current
VPA's legality grid are too vague. Consequently, operators are unaware
of what exactly they have to comply with. This prevents exporters from
shipping wood to the EU, even if they are eligible for FLEGT licensing or
able to establish a DDS. Instead, “the haziness pushes a considerable
number of operators directly to markets without due diligence re-
quirements. In the long run, this is problematic since it will become
gradually more diﬃcult to return to the EU's wood market”. Put dif-
ferently, the unclear texts weaken the EU's impact and trading position
in Africa. Instead, intra-African trade is becoming more important for
Cameroon's producers as the total wood production in Cameroon did
not plummet (FAO, 2016). This is conﬁrmed by Cerutti et al. (2016)
who observed an increasing trend in Cameroonian log exports between
2005 and 2014. Note that this period's exogenous variable does not
have a signiﬁcant impact on the exports by the counterfactual. This
strengthens the earlier arguments which speciﬁcally link to the Ca-
meroonian case.
A main limitation of this approach follows the restriction to one
destination country (i.e. the EU). This prevents the analysis of multi-
lateral resistance terms (Behrens et al., 2012). However, the decreasing
exports towards the EU contrast with stable or increasing wood pro-
duction in Cameroon between 2000 and 2015 (FAO, 2016). This sug-
gests that Cameroon is shifting its exports towards new destination
countries from 2010 onwards, once the VPA's entry into force demon-
strated the future direction of policy reforms in Cameroon. This rea-
soning is conﬁrmed by Cerutti et al. (2016) who indicate that the Ca-
meroonian VPA became ‘the main external driver of reform in the forest
sector’ over the years. In addition, expert consultation conﬁrms the
assumed redirection, and identiﬁes India and China as two main new
Table 1
Coeﬃcients per VARX model, signiﬁcant at 5% conﬁdence interval level.
Model 1: VPA negotiations
November 2007 – April 2010
Model 2: VPA agreement, but not in force
May 2010 – November 2011
Model 3: VPA in force
December 2011 – present
Cameroon Counter factual Cameroon Counter factual Cameroon Counter factual
Constant term 4.89 26.00 N.S. 28.74 7.69 26.00
Autoregression coeﬃcients matrix - order 1
Cameroon 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.32 0.11
Counterfactual −0.22 0.46 −0.21 0.45 −0.22 0.46
Autoregression coeﬃcients matrix - order 2
Cameroon 0.27 −0.07 0.27 −0.06 0.26 −0.07
Counterfactual 0.22 N.S. 0.21 N.S. 0.22 N.S.
Autoregression coeﬃcients matrix - order 3
Cameroon 0.29 N.S. 0.31 N.S. 0.27 N.S.
Counterfactual 0.30 N.S. 0.28 N.S. 0.30 N.S.
Coeﬃcient of exogenous variable −3.62 N.S. N.S. −8.55 −4.18 N.S.
Note: Only the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients (at 5% conﬁdence interval) are displayed, “N.S.” indicates non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates. Each model's quality is checked by calculating the
multivariate Ljung-Box statistics for cross-correlation matrices, and analysis of the residual plots. “N.S.” stands for a non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimate.
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destination countries (Global Timber Platform, 2017). Note however
that Cameroon's surrounding countries might have started to redirect
their trade ﬂows from 2013 onwards, once the introduction of the EUTR
created a level playing ﬁeld for all wood suppliers to the EU. In-
suﬃcient time has passed since to 2013 in order to investigate the latter
assumption at present.
5.2. Impact of VPA negotiations
The VARX model indicates that Cameroon's wood exports are ne-
gatively aﬀected by the VPA negotiations, while no impact is detected
on exports by the counterfactual. The detection of the structural change
point which coincides with the start of the VPA negotiations in
Cameroon provides additional proof for the negative impact of this
period on Cameroon's exports.
In theory, the wood trading conditions between the EU and Cameroon
should not change during the VPA negotiations. Nevertheless, the VPA
negotiations distorted on Cameroon's exports. The explanation for this
phenomenon links to the initial reason that this paper also investigated the
impact of the period before the VPA came into force: the possibility of
anticipative behavior. Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) explained the an-
ticipation eﬀect by arguing that suppliers redirect ‘their exports in an-
ticipation of future market openings’. In the case of the VPA in Cameroon,
the wood operators possibly feared that the costs of the additional ob-
ligations outweighed the VPA's beneﬁts. Consequently, they started to
redirect their exports away from the EU, in anticipation of too stringent
export conditions on the EU wood market.
A second explanation for the anticipatory eﬀect was provided by
Csilla and Nilsson (2015) and Fontagné et al. (2015). They argue that
reduced trade policy uncertainty, also in relation to environmental
norms, triggers anticipative behavior. The outcome of a VPA negotia-
tion, however, is highly uncertain. Each VPA is tailor made according to
the needs of the wood-producing country (European Commission,
2017a,b,c). Hence, the type of products covered by each VPA, and the
VPA implementation phase, diﬀer from country to country (Van
Heeswijk and Turnhout, 2013; Wiersum and Elands, 2013). The un-
certainty which characterizes the VPA negotiation phase could have
reduced Cameroon's exports to the EU. In future, attention should be
paid to these negative consequences of often lengthy8 negotiation
periods, as it is diﬃcult for vulnerable markets to recover from set-
backs. Carodenuto and Cerutti (2014) provide a number of reasons that
also make Cameroon's wood market vulnerable, e.g. a lack of organi-
zation, corruption, and illegal production.
During the negotiation phase in Cameroon, the counterfactual's
wood exports to the EU did not decrease, despite the overall decreasing
trend in 2000–2015. This can be explained by the substitution eﬀect
between Cameroon and the counterfactual as wood suppliers to the EU.
Reduced exports by Cameroon were compensated by exports from the
counterfactual. Ferreira and Vincent (2010) provide an alternative ex-
planation for this phenomenon. They describe the nonmonotonic mar-
ginal impact of improved forest governance on wood harvests in de-
veloping countries: countries with improving forest governance
experience reduced harvests, while harvests in countries with weaker
governance were increased.
5.3. Impact of the VPA agreement prior to its entry into force
Cameroon's wood exports to the EU seemed to revive again in the
period between the VPA agreement and it coming into force. This
contrasts to the negative impact of the VPA negotiations (due to un-
certainty and anticipative behavior) and the VPA coming into force (too
stringent trade conditions, or the anticipation to more stringent trade
conditions). Further analysis demonstrated that the monthly export
levels throughout this period were signiﬁcantly higher (7.16 index
points) than the export levels for the same month in the previous year.
This indicates that Cameroon's exports increased signiﬁcantly between
the agreement and the VPA coming into force.
This 19month period of increased exports is exceptional for two
reasons. First, this was the longest consecutive period which showed a
signiﬁcantly increasing trend throughout the entire 2000–2015 period.
The runner-up period only comprised 12months. Second, this period of
increased Cameroonian exports occurred between the VPA negotiations
and the VPA coming into force. Both periods even accelerated the de-
cline of Cameroon's exports.
This paper argues that the timing of the revival of exports by
Cameroon is not coincidental. We have already argued that the un-
certainty concerning the VPA negotiations negatively aﬀected
Cameroon's exports. The conclusion of the negotiations in May 2010
ended this period of uncertainty. In addition, the wood operators be-
came aware of the more stringent trading conditions they would face
once the VPA came into force. This prepared the ground for opportu-
nistic behavior to increase exports from Cameroon to the EU. This be-
havior corresponds to the type of behavior observed when (interna-
tional) trade quotas for natural resources are managed according to a
“ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served” basis (Larabi et al., 2013).9 This technique is
also most often applied by the EU (De Gorter and Sheldon, 2000;
Table 2
Coeﬃcients for the VARX models of all VPA implementing countries in the counterfactual.
Country Models' coeﬃcients
Negotiations Agreement Into force
Rep of the Congo N.S. (11months) 14.697
(46months)
−67.11





CAR N.S. (15months) N.S. (18months) −13.646




Cameroon – counterfactual N.S. (30months) −8.554
(20months)
N.S.
Note: Implementation process in Central African Republic: start negotiations in October 2009, agreement in December 2010, entry into force in July 2012.
Implementation process in the Republic of Congo: start negotiations in June 2008, agreement in May 2009, entry into force in March 2013.
8 The negotiation period in Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Côte
d'Ivoire is even lengthier. They started in September 2010, October 2010 and February
2013, respectively, but at the time of writing have not yet been concluded.
9 This is, for example, the case where ﬁshery quotas are opened. The competitive
nature of the sector results in high ﬁll rates of the quota, and the so-called phenomenon of
the “race for ﬁsh”.
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European Commission, 2017a,b,c). Operators export increased volumes
of wood as long as the more advantageous trading conditions apply (as
long as the quota is not ﬁlled). Once the more stringent trading con-
ditions apply (or the quota is ﬁlled), exports drop. Unfortunately, this
kind of short term opportunistic behavior threatens the sustainable
management of natural resources and creates the risk of over-
exploitation (Larabi et al., 2013).
Note that in between the VPA agreement and VPA coming into
force, the VARX model indicates a negative impact on the counter-
factual's exports. This is again explained by the substitution eﬀect be-
tween Cameroon and the counterfactual as wood suppliers to the EU.
While the EU is obtaining more wood from Cameroon, this occurs at the
expense of the counterfactual's exports.
5.4. Possibility to extrapolate results
This research applies a VARX model individually for Cameroon be-
cause each VPA is unique. Our analysis does not allow the simultaneous
analysis for diﬀerent exporting countries (e.g. panel data including the
exporting countries separately, and adding dummy variables to control for
the implementation phases of the diﬀerent VPAs). Consequently, our re-
search results cannot easily be extrapolated and the conclusions remain
suggestive. Therefore we repeated the analysis for those West-African
countries which also implemented a VPA, except Liberia and Ghana. The
research initially focused on Cameroon because of the importance of, and
presence of interesting features in the Cameroonian case (e.g. their im-
plementation process was much shorter, or ﬁnalized in the recent past).
The analysis was not completed for Ghana, as this country's exports are not
stationary, nor for Liberia as this country only recently concluded its VPA
(end of 2013, leaving only 14 observations).
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2. The results cannot
conﬁrm a negative impact of the VPA negotiation period on the exports by
the Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. However, this
might be due to the short negotiation periods in those countries. The ob-
servations for the period in between the VPA agreement and its entry into
force in the Republic of Congo are more interesting. For the Republic of
Congo, this period encompasses 46months, and surpasses the length of the
same period in Cameroon. In accordance with our observation in Ca-
meroon, this analysis ﬁnds a signiﬁcant negative impact for this period on
Republic of Congo's counterfactual export towards the EU. In addition, we
observe a positive impact on Republic of Congo's own exports. This esti-
mate was not found signiﬁcant in the case of Cameroon, albeit the fact that
we observed a signiﬁcant revival of Cameroon's exports throughout this
period. Hence, the ﬁndings for the Republic of Congo conﬁrm the devel-
oped rationale for short-term overexploitation of a VPA partner country's
forest just prior to a VPAs entry into force. Finally, the analysis ﬁnds a
negative impact for the VPA entry into force on both Republic of Congo
and Central African Republic, and simultaneously on the trade ﬂows by
their counterfactual. The impact on the VPA partner countries' exports is
considerably higher however.
Notice as well that both Republic of Congo and Central African
Republic were part of Cameroon's counterfactual, for which no impact
was found at the entry into force of the VPA in Cameroon. This seems to
conﬁrm the idea that taking the mean of the exports of a suﬃcient
number of neighboring countries levels out the eﬀect of country speciﬁc
events (such as political unrest, but also a country's VPA implementa-
tion process). In addition, these ﬁndings conﬁrm that the VARX ap-
proach manages to capture the impact of the VPA entering into force.
6. Conclusion
Cameroon's wood exports to the EU have been characterized by a
decreasing trend throughout the 2000–2015 period. However, the VPA
implementation process accelerated this downward trend during two
phases. The most straightforward drop was initiated when the VPA
came into force (1st December 2011). The drop in exports is explained
by the observation that wood operators in Cameroon faced, or antici-
pated to, more stringent trading conditions, but were unable to become
FLEGT licensed because of the Cameroonian government's inability to
issue licenses and the high accompanying costs. The FLEGT license is
key in acquiring access to the EU's wood market. In addition, once
FLEGT licensing becomes possible, it will become a challenge to acquire
a license. Challenges include high upfront costs, and the unclear pre-
scriptions for legality. The high upfront costs also create a risk of in-
creased income disparity in Cameroon, as only the most aﬄuent op-
erators can apply for a license and beneﬁt from the new export
opportunities.
An earlier drop was observed throughout the entire VPA negotiation
period (November 2007 – May 2010). On the one hand, this drop is
explained by the uncertainty of the outcome of the negotiations. On the
other hand, anticipatory behavior could have triggered the redirection
of Cameroon's exports towards countries with less stringent legality
requirements. Both drops are problematic, since the VPA actually aims
to strengthen Cameroon's competitive position in the international
wood market. For a vulnerable wood market, it is hard to bridge longer
periods with declining revenues and sales. Alternatively, if a consider-
able part of the oﬃcially recorded Cameroonian wood entering the EU
was illegal prior to the VPA, the drop rather presents the intended eﬀect
of the stringent trade conditions.
Cameroon's wood export recovered between the VPA agreement and
it coming into force. Unfortunately, this revival was possibly due to the
fact that wood operators wanted to beneﬁt from the less stringent
trading conditions as long as they were applied (i.e. until the VPA came
into force). This opportunistic, and short-sighted, behavior is likely to
harm sustainable forest management and could result in over-
exploitation.
Finally, this paper also reveals a substitution eﬀect between
Cameroon and its neighboring countries as wood supplier to the EU.
None of the countries supplies a unique product, so this comes as no
surprise. This ﬁnding also links to the nonmonotonic impact of in-
creased forest governance. It raises harvests in regions with weak
governance, while it reduces harvest in regions with strong governance.
The concentration of the export activities in a handful conglomerates,
who can easily switch operations between the Congo basin's countries
likely aggravates the substitution eﬀect. Nonetheless, from Cameroon's
point of view, this increases the importance of a good trading re-
lationship (through a VPA) with the EU as this could become a com-
petitive advantage. Especially since the VPA into force in 2010 implies
a 3 year head start for Cameroon over its neighboring countries which
face the EUTR's DDS since 2013.
Appendix A. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for stationarity and correlation tests on the components of Cameroon's and the
counterfactual's exports
A.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests
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A.2. Further exploration of seasonal component of both time series
Table A1














Correlation test and simple OLS between seasonal components of both time series demonstrates signiﬁcant positive correlation
(tsseason= seasonal component counterfactual's exports, tsseasonc= seasonal component Cameroon's exports):
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Appendix B. Output VARX model
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